



Multilateralism in the balance: Expectations from COP30

Belém, Nov 9 (Meena Raman/Radhika Chatterjee+) -The 30th session of the meeting of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [COP30] will take place from November 10 – 21, in Belém, Brazil. Parties are also expected to advance the work of COP30, the 20th session of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 20), 7th session of the meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7), and the 63rd sessions of the Scientific Body for Implementation (SBI 63) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 63). [See further details below on the main issues to watch out for].

While the formal negotiating sessions commence on Nov. 10, a gathering of close to 60 world leaders was convened by the Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva on Nov. 6-7 in Belem, for a Leaders Summit. The President called on world leaders “to do more for the planet and to reaffirm their commitment to climate multilateralism” and to “restore mutual trust and the spirit of collective mobilization”.

Issuing the “Call of Belem for the Climate”, Lula said that “The goals we set in the Climate Convention and its instruments will only be achieved if the world embarks on an accelerated path of transformation. Ten years after the Paris Agreement, we are beginning a new decade focused on implementation. We must urgently

address the shortcomings: in our climate commitments (the ambition gap); in what we are actually doing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (the implementation gap); and in the necessary financial, technological, and capacity-building support for developing countries to carry out their transition (the means-of implementation gap)”. He also added further that “rich countries have developed unsustainably over the past few centuries, at the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, as recognized in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Therefore, they have a material and historical obligation to help other countries develop sustainably and in a way that is less harmful to the planet. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the past.”

President Lula’s call comes at a time when multilateralism hangs in a very fragile balance. In light of the United States’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the Trump administration’s overt denial of climate change — coupled with the United States’ aggressive promotion of fossil fuels, including pressuring both developed and developing countries through trade deals to increase fossil-based energy consumption — the global trajectory has veered dangerously toward climate catastrophe.

The U.S President's stance like that of a schoolyard bully whose actions threaten the collective well-being, demands a unified and forceful response from the rest of the international community. Yet, at the Bonn climate talks in June this year, the rest of the developed world failed to demonstrate meaningful commitment to renewed cooperation with developing countries. This was especially clear in relation to matters on finance and the means of implementation, where meaningful progress was not possible. [See further details below].

Meanwhile, just ahead of the COP, many developing countries from Jamaica, Cuba and Haiti to Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam, have witnessed turbo-charged super-typhoons with devastating destruction, including the loss of many lives. In this context, calls for COP 30 to accelerate action on adaptation and loss and damage can be expected to be even louder.

It has never been clearer that it is no longer sufficient to merely invoke the need to save multilateralism. What is at stake is far greater — we must deliver on saving the planet and protecting the world's most vulnerable. This demands genuine, transformative solutions rooted in international cooperation, not the tired cycle of blame-shifting and rhetorical sleight of hand.

The time for smokescreens and symbolic gestures has passed; what is needed now is bold, accountable action that prioritises justice, equity and survival. Whether this will prevail remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, in relation to the recently released synthesis report by the UNFCCC's secretariat of Parties nationally determined contributions [NDCs] under the Paris Agreement, the report only covers the NDCs submitted till the end of September this year. It also includes the NDC of the U.S, although it has exited the Agreement. As it states, "Since this report considers 64 new NDCs, covering 30 per cent of global GHG emissions in 2019, it is not possible to provide a clear picture of the aggregated effect of all NDCs towards achieving the objective of the Convention... and towards [the temperature goal mentioned in] ...of the Paris Agreement."

Many more countries have submitted their NDCs after the Sept, which include the European Union and China. It is expected that the synthesis report will be updated to reflect the current status of the aggregate effect of the NDCs and their implications. The main message is not likely to change, which is that governments remain far off track in limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C — or even 2°C — above pre-industrial levels and it can be widely expected that this will trigger many calls from many Parties to respond to the NDCs synthesis report.

However, the elephant in the room remains: who will bridge the global emissions gap? Clearly, it is not just to expect developing countries to shoulder greater responsibility when developed nations — historically the largest emitters — have yet to deliver their fair share of reductions. Despite their disproportionate use of the planet's atmospheric space and longstanding promises to lead on climate action, many developed nations have fallen short. The burden of closing the gap cannot be shifted onto those who contributed least to the crisis and who now face the steepest challenges in adapting to the consequences. [See [TWN Belem Update 1](#) for more.]

In Belem, among the several critical issues to watch out for are highlighted below.

ADOPTION OF PROVISIONAL AGENDAS

In the provisional agendas of the [CMA](#) and [COP](#) dated September 5, two new matters have been included at the request of the **Like-minded developing countries [LMDC]** viz. (i) "Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement" on the mandatory obligation of developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries, and on (ii) "Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures" [which include carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) adopted by the **EU**, and similar proposals by the **United Kingdom** and **Canada**.] Also included in the provisional agenda of the CMA is a request by the **African Group** to include the matter of the 'Special needs and special circumstances of Africa'.

Following the issue of the provisional agenda for the CMA, several new items for inclusion have been proposed by various Parties, which appear in a supplementary provisional agenda for consideration.

One item is a proposal entitled 'Implementation of Decision 1/CMA.5 on the outcome of the first global stocktake', which has been requested by **Honduras, Papua New Guinea, and Suriname**, another is a proposal from the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** for the inclusion of an item on 'Responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions and addressing the 1.5 °C ambition and implementation gap,' and a latest proposal for inclusion by the **EU** submitted on 6 Nov. on 'Synthesis of biennial transparency reports'. [Biennial transparency reports [BTRs] are required by Parties to be submitted every two years under the enhanced transparency framework of the Paris Agreement to indicate what progress Parties have been making under their NDCs. The first submission of BTRs were due by Dec. 2024].

Given the variety of proposals from Parties for additional agenda items, the incoming Brazilian Presidency has been consulting Parties these past weeks on how to proceed, given a lack of consensus on the inclusion of these items. The Presidency's hope is for having a smooth adoption of the agendas, with no delays in commencing negotiations. Going by previous experiences, it is not going to be an easy and smooth start for the Belem talks with the likely agenda-fights, unless some resolution is found ahead of the COP opening on Nov 10.

ADAPTATION

Belem will be significant for important adaptation related outcomes under the CMA which relate to the (i) Global Goal on Adaptation [GGA] and (ii) National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

GGA: UAE -Belém work programme on indicators

At CMA7, the work on the development of indicators under the UAE-Belém work programme under GGA is expected to be a key outcome. [The GGA thematic targets cover water, food and

agriculture, health, ecosystems and biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements, poverty eradication and livelihoods and protection of cultural heritage, while the dimensional targets are impact, vulnerability and risk assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring, evaluation and learning.]

In June this year, at the meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies [SB 62], Parties discussed what further guidance they would provide experts for finalizing the list of indicators and reducing their number to no more than 100. This final list of indicators will be up for political consideration by Parties. Negotiations over this matter continued till the final hours of SB 62 and there was a deadlock over the issue of means of implementation (MOI) indicators to measure achievements on implementation of adaptation actions. (See [TWN update](#)). Developed countries were against incorporating any MOI language that would stress their obligations, while developing countries wanted a clear emphasis on those obligations. Parties finally [agreed](#) to include MOI indicators to "measure access, quality and adaptation finance" as part of their guidance to experts.

Following the guidance from Parties, the expert group meeting on the development of indicators took place in August, the summary report of which can be found [here](#). The experts' [final technical report](#) and the [final list of indicators](#) was published in Sept. A [workshop](#) on the UAE-Belém indicators was also held in October to consider the final list of indicators. Parties will continue the consideration of this matter under the SBs in Belem.

National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)

At SB62, Parties adopted a procedural decision to continue consideration of NAPs on the basis of a [draft negotiating text](#) with a view to recommending a "draft decision" for consideration and adoption at CMA7. This draft negotiating text is the same as the conference room paper that was put forward by the **G77 and China** at SB 62, by compromising their positions to achieve an agreement with developed countries to advance the work (See [TWN update](#)).

Negotiations in Belém are expected to be difficult, given the dogged stance of developed countries to

exclude addressing the MOI for the formulation and implementation of the NAPs of developing countries. Whether this stance will change remains to be seen.

According to a UNFCCC secretariat [report](#) titled, "Progress in the process to formulate and implement NAPs", "As at 30 September 2025, 144 countries had initiated and launched the NAP process, and 67 developing countries, including 23 LDCs [Least developed countries] and 14 SIDS [Small Island developing states], had submitted their NAPs to the UNFCCC". This is a far cry from what Parties agreed to as part of the first global stocktake decision in 2023 for Parties that have not yet submitted their NAPs to have done so by 2025.

The secretariat's report also states that "countries are implementing the adaptation actions identified in their NAPs to address climate risks that align with the key thematic areas of the global goal on adaptation, although these actions are largely fragmented, are constrained by resources and capacity, and remain insufficient relative to escalating climate risks".

JUST TRANSITION WORK PROGRAMME

Parties decided to establish the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) at COP 27 in 2022 for "discussion of just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement". In the following year at COP28, Parties agreed on the elements of the JTWP and decided that the SBs shall guide the implementation of the work programme...". Parties also decided that the JTWP's work would be reviewed in 2026.

Last year at COP29, Parties adopted a procedural decision due to wide divergences on how to advance the work of JTWP. Earlier this year at SB 62, Parties continued that discussion and transmitted an [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-chairs. In Belem, Parties will continue consideration of these matters with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the CMA. With the entire informal note in brackets [noting lack of agreement], tough negotiations are expected.

There are three main issues that need to be addressed are: (i) the question of how the JTWP's

work should be advanced - whether through the creation of new institutional arrangements or not; (ii) the manner in which high level messages from the dialogues under the JTWP should be reflected in the decision; and (iii) the need for highlighting the importance of the means of implementation for implementing just transitions.

Developing countries are keen to advance the JTWP's work through the creation of new institutional arrangements and the provision of means of implementation for supporting the implementation of just transitions. Developed countries on the other hand, want to defer the decision on this issue till 2026 when the JTWP's work will be reviewed.

Further, developed countries want to focus the discussion on key high-level messages emerging from the dialogues, highlighting the fossil fuel phase-out while downplaying the international dimensions of opportunities, barriers and challenges. Developing countries have been stressing the need for a balanced reflection of high-level messages, emphasising the importance of international cooperation and on recognizing the right to development of developing countries [See [TWN update](#)].

Another key point of contention concerns the inclusion of unilateral measures such as CBAMs in the JTWP, which developing countries argue undermines the pursuit of their just transitions, while developed countries are opposed to having this addressed.

MITIGATION WORK PROGRAMME

Discussions at SB 62 focused on three main things: what would be required to make the mitigation work programme [MWP] a "safe space"; discussion on a digital platform that was first proposed by **Brazil** on behalf of **Group SUR** at COP29; and the structure of the draft decision that Parties would consider and adopt at CMA 7. Parties took note of an [informal note](#) prepared by the co-facilitators and adopted a procedural decision. Though the informal note lays out the structure of the draft decision, Parties have to decide on the details, which they are expected to do in Belém.

The key areas of divergence in these discussions

are expected to be on the issue of including high level messages from the global dialogues held as part of MWP's mandate; linking the MWP with Parties NDCs, especially the NDCs synthesis report; whether to continue discussions on the digital platform; and whether to take up the discussion on reviewing the work of the MWP or not.

Developed countries and some developing countries have been unhappy that the MWP has not been made a vehicle for the implementation of global mitigation efforts laid out in the first global stocktake [GST1] outcome and are keen to include high level messages that are focused on raising mitigation ambition. At SB 62, developing countries pointed out they have already been doing more than their fair share of mitigation ambition and emphasized the importance of the provision of the means of implementation (See [TWN update](#)). They also stressed the need for developed countries to raise their mitigation ambition urgently.

A high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition, as a mandated event, is also expected to discuss issues related to mitigation ambition during COP30.

WARSAW INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM [WIM] FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE

Decision [2/CMA.2](#) (para 46) recommended that the review of the WIM be held in 2024, and every five years thereafter. At SB 60, Parties finalised the terms of the review of WIM in 2024. However, they could not conclude the review at SB 61 in Baku last year. At CMA6, Parties requested SB 62 to continue consideration of WIM's review. At SB 62, Parties agreed to continue consideration of the matter at SB 63 on the basis of the [informal note](#) prepared at SB 62, with a view to recommending a draft decision for adoption by the CMA.

Key issues that are expected to be discussed are the need for scaling up loss and damage-related finance and other support, ensuring the complementarity and coordination of the various loss and damage constituted bodies [i.e., the WIM Executive Committee, the Santiago Network, and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage] and enhancing knowledge products, including the development of a regular global 'State of Loss and

Damage' report. These are some of the main demands made by developing countries which developed countries have been contesting, due to their concerns over new financing obligations they may have in this regard. (See [TWN update](#)).

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

The decision on GST 1 was adopted in 2023 at COP28. Discussions on GST related matters have been continuing since then under three agenda items: (i) the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of the decision, (ii) the annual GST dialogue and its report, referred to in paragraph 187 of the decision and (iii) the refinement of GST process referred to in paragraph 192 of the decision.

Last year, there was no consensus on any of these items. Rule 16 of the UNFCCC's draft rules of procedure was applied to the UAE dialogue and the annual GST dialogue. (Rule 16 provides that any agenda item whose consideration is not completed "shall be included automatically" in the agenda for the next session, unless decided by the COP).

At SB 62, there was again no consensus amongst Parties on GST related matters. They agreed to continue consideration of the UAE dialogue at SB 63 on the basis of the [informal note](#) that was prepared at SB 62. Similarly, on the refinement of GST process, Parties agreed to continue consideration at SB 63 on the basis of the [draft text](#) produced by the co-facilitators at SB 62. Further details are set out below.

UAE dialogue on para 97

The mandate to "establish the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes" was provided in para 97 of the GST decision. This paragraph was under the 'Finance' heading of the 'Means of implementation and support' section. Para 98 of the decision decided that the UAE dialogue will be operationalised starting from CMA 6 (2024) and conclude in 2028, and requested the SBI 60 to "develop modalities for the dialogue" for consideration by CMA 6.

Discussions on the UAE dialogue, particularly its scope, have been highly contentious from SBI 60 onwards. The key issue has been on the question of

whether the focus should be on the implementation of finance related elements of the GST outcomes or all elements of the GST outcome. At COP 29, the draft decision text proposed by the Azerbaijan Presidency for final consideration was rejected by some Parties led by developed countries such as Switzerland and the EU due to the absence of any reference to the preparation of an “annual report” in the decision text, which proponents saw as a means of “tracking” the implementation of the all the GST outcomes, including the implementation of paragraph 28 on the “transitioning away from fossil fuels” of the GST decision.

Deep divergences persisted amongst Parties in the discussions on the UAE dialogue at SB 62. These stemmed from the different understanding of the Paris Agreement architecture itself, the purpose of the GST and the purpose of the UAE dialogue itself.

Developed countries and some developing country groups repeated calls for producing annual reports from the dialogue, including the consideration of the “collective” assessment of Parties progress based on their national efforts and for adoption of CMA decisions thereon accordingly. Many other developing countries pointed out that such a report would amount to a mini-GST occurring annually, which is contrary to the architecture of the Paris Agreement, according to which the collective assessment of progress has to be done every five years, as provided for under Article 14. They stressed that the GST outcomes inform the preparations of Parties in the submission of their NDCs and NAPs, which are “nationally determined”, and that the next collective assessment process is the GST itself, conducted every five years, and which is not an annual process for the collective assessment of efforts.

Parties will continue these discussions in Belem, on the basis of an informal note produced by the co-facilitators, which is fully bracketed, and contains both the draft text that was produced at SB 62 and the draft text that was proposed by the COP29 Presidency. Divergences are expected to continue in this regard.

Annual GST Dialogue

The mandate for the annual dialogue stems from

para 187 of the GST decision, which is under the ‘Guidance and way forward’ section and requests the SB Chairs to “organise an annual GST dialogue”, “to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation of Parties’ next NDCs in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement”, and also requests the secretariat to prepare a report for consideration at its subsequent session”. At COP 29 in Baku, “Rule 16” was applied to the [report](#) of the 2024 [first annual GST dialogue](#) held during SB 60, with the [draft text](#) reflecting contestations over whether there should be key messages and substantive elements drawn from the summary report prepared by the secretariat, the timing of subsequent dialogues, and whether there should be a continuation or termination of the dialogue itself.

The second annual GST dialogue was held in June during SB62. The title of the dialogue was GST “NDC” dialogue. At CMA 7, Parties will be invited to consider the summary reports for 2024 and 2025 of the annual dialogues and to also take any action deemed appropriate. The main issue is over the purpose and continuation of the dialogue itself, when many Parties have already submitted their NDCs.

Refinement of the overall GST process

The second GST [GST 2] will need to conclude in 2028, with the process for inputs commencing in 2026 and the technical assessment phase taking place from 2027 to 2028. Para 192 of GST 1 decision decided that “consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake” shall commence at SB 60 and conclude at CMA 6. However, at CMA 6 Parties adopted a procedural decision for continuing consideration of the matter at SB 62.

At SB 62 discussions on this matter took place with Parties diverging on three key issues: (i) on providing a prescriptive timeline to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] for completing the seventh Assessment Report to align it with GST 2; (ii) timeline of the technical and political phases of GST 2; and (iii) the role of the high-level committee in the political phase of the

GST. Parties agreed to continue consideration of this matter on the basis of the [draft text](#) prepared by the co-facilitators. Given that the entire text is bracketed, discussions on this matter are expected to remain highly contentious.

MATTERS RELATED TO FINANCE

There are several matters on finance which will be the focus of attention in Belem.

Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement

CMA 4 in 2022 decided to launch the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue between Parties to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Agreement. [Article 2.1 (c) relates to making “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development”, while Article 9 in general refers to the obligations of developed countries for the provision and mobilisation of finance for developing countries]. CMA 5 decided to continue and strengthen the dialogue to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of the Article and its complementarity with Article 9, including with regard to the operationalization and implementation of Article 2.1(c) in 2024–2025.

In Belem, Parties have to consider the report prepared by the Co-chairs of the dialogue, summarizing the proceedings of the two workshops held in 2025, including a synthesis of all work undertaken under the dialogue in 2023–2025, with a view to decide on a way forward with regard to its deliberations on the matter. The report contains recommendations by the Co-chairs with the suggestion for continued engagement on efforts, challenges and opportunities on Article 2.1(c) implementation, in the “format of a dialogue” building on the experience of and lessons learned over the past three years.

Thus far, there has been no common understanding among Parties on the scope of the Article 2.1 (c). It can be expected that developed countries would want to continue the dialogue and upgrade it into a work programme or even call for a new agenda item altogether on Article 2.1(c), while some developing countries would call for an

end to the dialogue, given a lack of common understanding on the matter.

Baku to Belém Roadmap on 1.3 T

Para 27 of decision on the new collective quantified goal [NCQG] on finance from [1/CMA.6](#) last year launched the “*Baku to Belém Roadmap on 1.3 T*”, under the joint Presidencies of Azerbaijan and Brazil and requested “*the Presidencies to produce a report summarising the work as they conclude the work*” by CMA 7 in Belém. The Roadmap relates to scaling up of financing to developing countries with an aspirational target of reaching “*at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035*” contained in para 7 of the NCQG decision.

The expected [key outputs](#) of the work include: The Presidencies report summarizing the work undertaken on the Roadmap to 1.3T; (b) The production of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T report; and (c) Web-based content and material including a repository of information and inputs received.

The Roadmap was made available just a few days ago in early Nov. and is about 100 pages. It highlights that while sufficient global capital exists, the critical barriers are political will, fiscal constraints, high cost of capital, fragmented systems and weak access for vulnerable countries. The Roadmap proposes five action fronts (replenishing, rebalancing, rechanneling, revamping and reshaping) to strengthen supply of concessional–grant finance, create fiscal space, steer private finance, improve institutional capacity and reform systems for equitable flows. The Presidencies have also outlined some follow-up steps to the Roadmap. How Parties will react to the Roadmap remains to be seen, including on whether there will be any further follow-up in this regard.

Matters related to the Adaptation Fund

In Baku last year, Parties requested SBI 62 to consider the matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and to make recommendations on this matter for consideration at CMP 20 and CMA 7, respectively in Belém. In decisions taken in 2018, Parties agreed that the Adaptation Fund shall

exclusively serve the Paris Agreement once the share of proceeds under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement becomes available. Currently, the Adaptation Fund is financed by a share of proceeds from the certified emissions reductions (CERs) generated by the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (See [TWN update](#)).

Given that the governance of the Adaptation Fund is currently only under the CMP, there is the urgent need for the CMA to mandate the Adaptation Fund Board to conclude a new trustee agreement with the World Bank for the monetisation of the Article 6.4 share of proceeds, in order for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement.

At SB 62 during discussions on arrangements of the Adaptation Fund serving exclusively the Paris Agreement, Parties agreed on the need for a smooth transition of the Fund from the CMP to the Paris Agreement and acknowledged the importance of making this transition without losing any proceeds from the CDM (a matter in which Parties did not find any consensus at SB62 per this [draft decision](#)).

Another matter for consideration relates to the membership of the Adaptation Fund. The main contention in the discussions in this regard is over the issue of change in terminology of groups of Parties [from "Parties included in Annex 1 to the Convention (Annex 1 Parties)" and "Parties not included in Annex 1 to the Convention (non-Annex 1 Parties)"] as referenced under the Kyoto Protocol, to "developed country Parties" and "developing country Parties" respectively, aligned with the terminology used in the Paris Agreement.] [See [TWN update](#)]. Parties agreed to continue consideration of these matters in Belém on the basis of the work conducted at SBI 62 which was captured in this [informal note](#) and [conference room paper](#) (submitted by G77 and China).

TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME

The technology implementation programme [TIP] was established at COP28 in 2023 through the GST 1 decision. This was a key demand made by developing countries. According to paragraph 110 of the decision, the TIP is to be "*supported by, inter alia, the operating entities of the Financial*

Mechanism, to strengthen the support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism".

The TIP as a stand-alone CMA agenda item provides a valuable opportunity to advance the critical issue of "implementation" of technology development and transfer for developing countries, including for the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing countries as referred to in Article 4.5 of the Convention. Whether any advances will be made on this matter in Belem will be closely watched.

At SB 62, discussions on TIP reached a deadlock over the question of which text should be forwarded for further work in Belem. Different versions of the text contained diverging views on modalities of the TIP with developing countries wanting a stronger mandate for TIP such that it would prioritise technology needs of developing countries, while developed countries wanting the TIP to prioritize implementation of GST outcomes [See [TWN update](#)]. No agreement was reached and rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure was applied.

Among the main faultlines of discussion are expected to be over: which bodies should be responsible for TIP's implementation; whether the TIP should prioritize implementing technology needs identified by developing countries or the GST 1 outcome; and topics to be addressed in the global dialogues under the TIP.

ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON CARBON MARKETS AND NON-MARKET APPROACHES

Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 carbon markets

For the Article 6.2, which is the cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), Parties are expected to consider the compilation and synthesis of the results of the Article 6 technical expert review, and also an annual report on the activities relating to recording and tracking cooperative approaches prepared by the secretariat. This is under the agenda item of the

CMA on “Implementation of the guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement”.

According to the CMA 3 decision adopted in 2021, the UNFCCC secretariat was requested “to prepare annually a compilation and synthesis of the results of the Article 6 technical expert review, including identification of recurring themes and lessons learned”, for consideration by Parties, including in the context of its review of the guidance; and also provide an annual report to the Parties on the activities relating to recording and tracking cooperative approaches, including information on recorded ITMOs, corresponding adjustments and emission balances.

As regards Article 6.4, Parties will be invited to consider the annual report and the recommendations of the Supervisory Body with a view to adopting the recommendations and to provide guidance to the Supervisory Body, as

appropriate, under the CMA agenda item, “Report of the Supervisory Body and guidance for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement”. Parties will also be invited to elect members and alternate members of the Supervisory Body.

Article 6.8 on non-market approaches

At SB 62, there was no consensus on a decision on Article 6.8 on non-market approaches. In Belem, Parties will be invited to consider the progress and outcomes report of the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA), provide inputs to the review of the work programme that will take place next year at SBSTA 64 and 65, and take any action it deemed appropriate on the basis of the recommendations of the SBSTA.

[+With inputs from Hilary Kung]